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‘What are you doing?’, my wife asked, seeing me linger, unusually in front of the mirror.
‘Nothing’, I replied. ‘Just looking at myself, at my nose, here, inside this nostril. When I press
it, I feel a little pain.’
My wife smiled and said: ‘I thought you were looking to see which way it tilts.’
I wheeled around like a dog whose tail has been stepped on.
‘Tilts? My nose?’
Pirandello (1990)
Observing one’s face in the mirror provides an immediate strong sense of self. The ability to
recognize one’s face has been taken as an index of self-awareness and has been considered a
fundamental aspect within the spectrum of selfhood (Gallup, 1970; Rochat, 2009). However, what
is considered the most representative instance of personal identity is probably the less reliable
representation of the self; the rather infrequent encounters we have with our own face are in fact
mediated by a reflecting surface and likely distorted by a variety of expectations shaped by ourselves
and others (Rochat and Zahavi, 2011). How do we balance this information in order to maintain
a contentment and stable mental representation of our own identity? A new study by Serino
et al. (2015) provides evidence of the neural mechanisms that mediate the balance between online
multisensory cues and oﬄine stored self-representation for the update of self-face recognition.
That self-face representation is plastic and susceptible to changes is not to be news. Recent
studies (Tsakiris, 2008; Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a,b)
have applied the principles of multisensory integration of body-related signals (e.g., Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) to induce a sense of identification with a new face by
creating the Enfacement Illusion (EI). In the EI, the sight of an unfamiliar face being touched on
her cheek together with the participant’s own face creates a “mirror-like” experience and elicits
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a change in self-face recognition. The perfect correspondence
between what participants see and what they feel on their
face updates the oﬄine stored self-representation, albeit the
face identity they see is a different one. As a result, the other
person’s face observed during the Enfacement becomes included
in the mental representation of one’s own face (Tsakiris, 2008).
While Apps et al. (2015) used fMRI to explore the neural
underpinnings of self-identification and self-updating, Serino
et al. (2015) now provide further evidence of the role of
online multisensory processing in self-face recognition. This
research makes a relevant contribution to the state of art
in two fundamental ways. First, by employing visuo-motor
information (rather than the classic visuo-tactile feedback used
in the EI), the authors investigate the role of the most commonly
experienced multisensory information when facing one’s own
mirror reflection. By adopting a virtual-mirror setup, Serino et al.
(2015) show that the visuo-motor correspondence between self
and avatar’s movements elicits a change in self-face recognition.
In line with the EI, after being exposed to visuo-motor synchrony,
participants report the other face as resembling more one’s
own face. Second, this study provides crucial evidence of the
mediating effect of the online multisensory mechanism on the
oﬄine self-representation by showing that sensory-motor and
inferotemporal-occipital areas of the cortex are both involved in
self-face recognition (Serino et al., 2015).
These converging neuroimaging findings corroborate the
existing evidence that in adults the mental representation of
one’s face can be altered by multisensory processing, but what
happens when this oﬄine self-representation is not yet in
place? Different psychological accounts have historically tried
to explain the developmental markers of self-face recognition.
The reference paradigm used in most of these studies is the
“mirror-test,” which consists in placing a red spot in the child’s
forehead or nose and test whether, when faced with a mirror,
the child notices the spot (Gallup, 1970; Amsterdam, 1972).
Children’s successful attempt to reach for the spot is taken
as evidence of self-recognition. Despite the extensive research
done using Gallup’s mirror-test for the investigation of self-
recognition in chimpanzees (Gallup, 1970), dolphins (Parker
et al., 1994), elephants (Plotnik et al., 2006), and human
infants (e.g., Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal and Fischer, 1978;
Povinelli et al., 1996), the paradigm has been criticized because
of the high variability of performance across ages (Rochat,
2007, 2009) and cultures (Broesch et al., 2010), and its strict
criteria (Bahrick et al., 1996). With regard to the latter point,
the idea that self-consciousness is a unitary phenomenon,
which can be measured through a “yes/no” task, has been
rejected by psychologists and philosophers. In fact, in order to
recognize themselves, infants must rely on the exploration of
the perfect correspondence of sensory information and match
the seen featural cues of the visual appearance to the self.
The mirror-test disregards the relationship between these two
complex components. While recent evidence suggests that some
predisposition to multisensory body-related cues is present soon
after birth (Filippetti et al., 2013, 2015), the presence of an in-
built representation of self-appearance is unlikely, and infants
encountering a mirror must match the motor information with
the reflected visual output and eventually link the featural cues of
the reflection with themselves.
Serino and colleagues’ findings (2015) provide a fundamental
starting point for research on the developmental processes
involved in self-recognition and self-other differentiation. On
one hand, their evidence of the presence of neural mechanisms
responsible of the mediation between online and oﬄine self-
recognition in adults can pave the way for future investigation
on the brain processes involved in the developing self in infancy
and childhood. Additionally, evidence from neuroimaging
can disentangle the respective roles of physical (e.g., self-
reflection) and social (e.g., imitative interaction) mirrors, by
exploring how the infant brain responds to variations in
multisensory correspondences and visual appearance. At present,
the developmental origins of self/other differentiation are still
unknown and one of the pressing questions is whether the self
emerges as a consequence of repetitive mirroring interactions
with others, rather than as a-priori fundament of human beings
(Prinz, 2013). While significant information about the self can
be exploited from interactions with others, I posit that self-
recognition is the result of both self-exploration and exchanges
with others. Through a process of balance between multisensory
processing and experience with one’s facial appearance, sensory-
motor and face-related areas of the cortex mediate this
interaction. The findings from Serino et al. (2015) provide the
starting point of investigation for future developmental research
in this direction.
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